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Response snapshot Oct 26, 2026, 23:01 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-104795

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the...

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
8.8 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.2% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

Check the vendor advisory for affected versions and fixes.

Read NVD CVE-2026-104795 (opens a new tab)

What happened

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator:

1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5.

The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.

Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**

Continue reading

The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`

```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ```

```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ```

### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`

```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ```

### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)

**File:** `version_executable.rs`

```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ```

## Attack Pattern

**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node

**Attack sequence:**

1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3.

When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

8.8

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.2%

Scored Percentile 5.0%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Sources

  1. Primary source

    NVD CVE-2026-104795 (opens a new tab)

    NVD record: description, CVSS (the CNA score is preferred), affected products, and publication date. Not evidence of exploitation.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-104795, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 20). The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the... (CVE-2026-104795). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-104795

MLA

"The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the... (CVE-2026-104795)." KEVWire, 20 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-104795.

Chicago

KEVWire. "The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the... (CVE-2026-104795)." Last modified October 20, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-104795.

Evidence summary (plain text)

The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the... (Oct 14, 2026).
The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)
that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a
container, the coordinator:

1. **fork()s** a child process
2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces
3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root
   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)
4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving
   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted
   capability set**
5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability
   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**
6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with
   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from
   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**
7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()`
   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount
   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**

The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with
`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor
container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.

## Affected Code

### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)

**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`

```rust
// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers
join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;
change_dir(current_dir);
switch_user(*process.uid)?;
if *process.uid != 0 {
    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()
        .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints");
}
fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);
```

```rust
// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0
fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {
    debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}");
    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))
}
```

### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)

**File:** `fingerp
CVSS 8.8 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 20, 2026; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795).
EPSS 0.2% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-104795&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
NVD CVE-2026-104795: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?pubStartDate=2026-10-12T13:35:55.142Z&pubEndDate=2026-10-26T13:35:55.142Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=2500
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-104795&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-104795.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 26, 2026, 19:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

NVD status: Awaiting Analysis. Publication in the NVD is not evidence of exploitation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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Record details

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