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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 00:06 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-113666

ApostropheCMS: Authenticated projection-exclusion prototype-member deletion in @apostrophecms/db-connect causes process-wide denial of service

`@apostrophecms/db-connect` ships an in-memory MongoDB emulation used by its SQLite, PostgreSQL, and multipostgres adapters. Its `unsetNestedField` helper walks an attacker-controlled dotted field path with no segment validation and calls `delete` on the resolved property.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
7.1 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.4% in the next 30 days
Sources
2 independent sources

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: @apostrophecms/db-connect: 1.1.0; apostrophe: 4.33.0. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969 (opens a new tab)

What happened

## Summary

`@apostrophecms/db-connect` ships an in-memory MongoDB emulation used by its SQLite, PostgreSQL, and multipostgres adapters. Its `unsetNestedField` helper walks an attacker-controlled dotted field path with no segment validation and calls `delete` on the resolved property.

A low-privileged authenticated user (any role holding `view-draft`, which every editor and contributor has; reduced to any logged-in user when `guestApiAccess` is enabled) can send a piece-type REST GET request whose `project` query builder contains an exclusion key such as `constructor.prototype.hasOwnProperty`. On a SQLite or PostgreSQL adapter this key reaches `unsetNestedField`, which resolves `Object.

prototype` and deletes a shared runtime method. Because that method is shared across the whole Node process, the deletion breaks request handling for every tenant and user until the process is restarted, giving a single request a persistent denial of service.

Continue reading

## Root Cause

The projection query builder laundens only projection values, never projection keys, so an arbitrary dotted key survives to the database layer. On the SQLite and PostgreSQL adapters an exclusion projection is applied in JavaScript by `applyProjection`, which for each excluded field calls `unsetNestedField(result, field)`. `unsetNestedField` splits the field on `.

` and walks the resulting segments with no guard: unlike its sibling `setNestedField`, it does not even block a literal `__proto__`, and neither helper blocks `constructor` or `prototype`. Because the working object is a plain object produced by `JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(doc))`, its `constructor` resolves to the global `Object`, so a path of `constructor.prototype. ` reaches the shared `Object.

prototype` and deletes a core, configurable method. The violated invariant is that untrusted input must never be able to traverse into and mutate shared prototype objects.

```text Affected functions (repository-relative paths): - unsetNestedField packages/db-connect/lib/shared.js:119-129 (no segment guard; delete on resolved property) - applyProjection packages/db-connect/lib/shared.js:164-216 (exclusion branch calls unsetNestedField per excluded key) Reachability driver (consumer on a SQL adapter): - project.launder / project.

finalize packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/doc-type/index.js:2003-2103 - getRestQuery packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1139-1157 - SQLite adapter applyProjection call packages/db-connect/adapters/sqlite.js:906,980 ```

## Impact

Prerequisites: an authenticated account holding `view-draft` (every editing role; any logged-in user when `guestApiAccess: true`), and a consumer configured to use a SQLite, PostgreSQL, or multipostgres adapter. The default `mongodb` adapter hands the projection to the real MongoDB driver and is not affected.

With those conditions, a single crafted GET request deletes an attacker-chosen shared prototype method (for example `Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty`, `toString`, or an `Array.prototype` member). The demonstrated capability is a persistent, process-wide denial of service: after the deletion, ordinary calls such as `obj.hasOwnProperty(...)

` throw across Apostrophe, its dependencies, and the database driver, so the affected Node process cannot service requests for any user until it is restarted. The attacker chooses which member to remove, and the corruption of shared runtime state persists for the life of the process.

## Proof of Concept

`The finding was reproduced by executing the shipped helper directly against the published db-connect source; a live consumer requires a SQLite or PostgreSQL adapter, an authenticated view-draft session, and at least one matching document.`

1. Authenticate as any user with `view-draft` on a site whose database adapter is `sqlite`, `postgres`, or `multipostgres`. 2. Issue a piece-type REST read with an exclusion projection whose key targets a shared prototype method. 3. Observe that subsequent requests fail process-wide because the shared method was deleted.

```text GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/article?project[constructor.prototype.hasOwnProperty]=0 Cookie: ```

```text safe benign exclusion {title:0} leaves Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty intact VULNERABLE exclusion projection deleted Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty (callableBefore=true, brokeEveryObject=true) VULNERABLE exclusion projection deleted an arbitrary Object.prototype method (__pocMarker) ```

## Attack Chain

1. **Exposure:** An authenticated `view-draft` user calls the piece-type REST GET endpoint `GET /api/v1/@apostrophecms/ `, which is reachable by any editing role. 2. **Control:** The query string `project[constructor.prototype.hasOwnProperty]=0` is parsed by `qs` (with `allowDots` off) into a single own key with literal dots, `{ 'constructor.prototype.hasOwnProperty': '0' }`. 3.

**Path:** `getRestQuery` applies the query builders first; `project.launder` copies the key verbatim and coerces only the value to `false`; `project.finalize` skips the falsy value with `if (!val) continue` and preserves the key; the cursor stores it as the projection. 4.

**Guard:** The `publicApiProjection` override that would discard the attacker projection runs only when `canAccessApi(req)` is false, so it is skipped for the authenticated caller; no key allowlist, segment check, or prototype guard exists anywhere on the path. 5. **Primitive:** On the SQLite or PostgreSQL adapter, `applyProjection` takes the exclusion branch and calls `unsetNestedField(result, 'constructor.

prototype.hasOwnProperty')`, which resolves `Object.prototype` and executes `delete Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty`. 6. **Result:** A shared prototype method is removed for the entire Node process, so request handling throws for all users and tenants until restart.

## Bypass Evidence

The relevant protections were examined individually and none blocks this path. The projection `launder` (packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/doc-type/index.j

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: @apostrophecms/db-connect: < 1.1.0 apostrophe: < 4.33.0

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

7.1

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.4%

Scored Percentile 38.3%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969 (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  4. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  5. Primary source

    NVD CVE-2026-113666 (opens a new tab)

    NVD record: description, CVSS (the CNA score is preferred), affected products, and publication date. Not evidence of exploitation.

    Published Checked

  6. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  7. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-113666, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 20). ApostropheCMS: Authenticated projection-exclusion prototype-member deletion in @apostrophecms/db-connect causes process-wide denial of service (CVE-2026-113666). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-113666

MLA

"ApostropheCMS: Authenticated projection-exclusion prototype-member deletion in @apostrophecms/db-connect causes process-wide denial of service (CVE-2026-113666)." KEVWire, 20 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-113666.

Chicago

KEVWire. "ApostropheCMS: Authenticated projection-exclusion prototype-member deletion in @apostrophecms/db-connect causes process-wide denial of service (CVE-2026-113666)." Last modified October 20, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-113666.

Evidence summary (plain text)

ApostropheCMS: Authenticated projection-exclusion prototype-member deletion in @apostrophecms/db-connect causes process-wide denial of service (Oct 20, 2026).
`@apostrophecms/db-connect` ships an in-memory MongoDB emulation used by its SQLite, PostgreSQL, and multipostgres adapters. Its `unsetNestedField` helper walks an attacker-controlled dotted field path with no segment validation and calls `delete` on the resolved property. A low-privileged authenticated user (any role holding `view-draft`, which every editor and contributor has; reduced to any logged-in user when `guestApiAccess` is enabled) can send a piece-type REST GET request whose `project` query builder contains an exclusion key such as `constructor.prototype.hasOwnProperty`. On a SQLite or PostgreSQL adapter this key reaches `unsetNestedField`, which resolves `Object.prototype` and deletes a shared runtime method. Because that method is shared across the whole Node process, the deletion breaks request handling for every tenant and user until the process is restarted, giving a single request a persistent denial of service.

The projection query builder laundens only projection values, never projection keys, so an arbitrary dotted key survives to the database layer. On the SQLite and PostgreSQL adapters an exclusion projection is applied in JavaScript by `applyProjection`, which for each excluded field calls `unsetNestedField(result, field)`. `unsetNestedField` splits the field on `.` and walks the resulting segments with no guard: unlike its sibling `setNestedField`, it does not even block a literal `__proto__`, and neither helper blocks `constructor` or `prototype`. Because the working object is a plain object produced by `JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(doc))`, its `constructor` resolves to the global `Object`, so a path of `constructor.prototype. ` reaches the shared `Object.prototype` and deletes a core, configurable method. The violated invariant is that untrusted input must never be able to traverse into and mutate shared prototype objects.
CVSS 7.1 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 20, 2026; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113666).
EPSS 0.4% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-113666&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j5rq-xfvr-p969
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc&after=Y3Vyc29yOnYyOpK0MjAyNi0xMC0yMVQyMDo0NTowN1rOAAfvzQ%3D%3D
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc&after=Y3Vyc29yOnYyOpK0MjAyNi0xMC0yMVQyMDozMDoyNlrOAAfvxw%3D%3D
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc&after=Y3Vyc29yOnYyOpK0MjAyNi0xMC0yMVQyMDowMzo1N1rOAAfvxQ%3D%3D
NVD CVE-2026-113666: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113666
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?pubStartDate=2026-10-12T13:35:55.142Z&pubEndDate=2026-10-26T13:35:55.142Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=6000
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-113666&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-113666.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 26, 2026, 19:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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