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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 17:26 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-32633

Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`

In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
9.1 Critical (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: Glances: 4.5.2. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m (opens a new tab)

What happened

## Summary

In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret.

If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance.

## Details

Continue reading

The Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list:

```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805 def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []) ```

The main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all:

```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480 if self.args.password: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)]) else: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) ```

The Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default:

```python # glances/main.py:425-427 parser.add_argument( '--bind', default='0.0.0.0', dest='bind_address', ) ```

During Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field:

```python # glances/servers_list.py:141-148 def __update_stats(self, server): server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server) ... if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc': self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server) elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag: self.__update_stats_rest(f"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}", server) ```

For protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI:

```python # glances/servers_list.py:119-130 def get_uri(self, server): if server['password'] != "": if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED': clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name']) if clear_password is not None: server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password) uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format( server['username'], server['password'], server['name'], server['port'], ) else: uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port']) return uri ```

Password lookup falls back to a global default:

```python # glances/password_list.py:55-58 try: return self._password_dict[host] except (KeyError, TypeError): return self._password_dict['default'] ```

The sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse:

```ini # conf/glances.conf:656-663 [passwords] # localhost=abc # default=defaultpassword ```

The secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication:

```python # glances/password.py:72-74,94 # For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True): # 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit password = password_hash ```

```python # glances/client.py:56-57 if args.password != "": self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}' ```

The Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it:

```javascript // glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103 fetch("api/4/serverslist", { method: "GET" }) ... window.location.href = server.uri; ```

So once `server.uri` contains credentials, those credentials are not just used internally; they are exposed to API consumers and frontend JavaScript.

## PoC

### Step 1: Verified local live proof that server objects contain credential-bearing URIs

The following command executes the real `glances/servers_list.py` update logic against a live local HTTP server that always returns `401`. This forces Glances to mark the downstream server as `PROTECTED` and then retry with the saved/default password. After the second refresh, the in-memory server list contains a `uri` field with embedded credentials.

```bash cd D:\bugcrowd\glances\repo @' import importlib.util import json import sys import threading import types from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from pathlib import Path from defusedxml import xmlrpc as defused_xmlrpc

pkg = types.ModuleType('glances') pkg.__apiversion__ = '4' sys.modules['glances'] = pkg

client_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.client') class GlancesClientTransport(defused_xmlrpc.xmlrpc_client.Transport): def set_timeout(self, timeout): self.timeout = timeout client_mod.GlancesClientTransport = GlancesClientTransport sys.modules['glances.client'] = client_mod

globals_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.globals') globals_mod.json_loads = json.loads sys.modules['glances.globals'] = globals_mod

logger_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.logger') logger_mod.logger = types.SimpleNamespace( debug=lambda *a, **k: None, warning=lambda *a, **k: None, info=lambda *a, **k: None, error=lambda *a, **k: None, ) sys.modules['glances.logger'] = logger_mod

password_list_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.password_list') class GlancesPasswordList: pass password_list_mod.GlancesPasswordList = GlancesPasswordList sys.modules['glances.password_list'] = password_list_mod

dynamic_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_dynamic') class GlancesAutoDiscoverServer: pass dynamic_mod.GlancesAutoDiscoverServer = GlancesAutoDiscoverServer sys.modules['glances.servers_list_dynamic'] = dynamic_mod

static_mod = types.ModuleType('glances.servers_list_static') class Gl

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: Glances: <= 4.5.2-dev01

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

9.1

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 27). Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist` (CVE-2026-32633). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-32633

MLA

"Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist` (CVE-2026-32633)." KEVWire, 27 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-32633.

Chicago

KEVWire. "Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist` (CVE-2026-32633)." Last modified October 27, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-32633.

Evidence summary (plain text)

Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist` (Mar 16, 2026).
In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret.

If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance.
CVSS 9.1 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 27, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r297-p3v4-wp8m
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-32633.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 27, 2026, 17:25 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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