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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 16:01 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-60083

SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files

`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`'s `resolvePath()` includes an explicit comment stating its sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist (`refuseToAccess()` in `kernel/api/file.

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
4.9 Medium (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 (opens a new tab)

What happened

## Summary

`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`'s `resolvePath()` includes an explicit comment stating its sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist (`refuseToAccess()` in `kernel/api/file.go`), following the remediation for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 ("Unauthenticated Administrator takeover exfiltrated via the MCP"), which specifically recommended restricting this tool's scope.

In practice, the MCP tool implements only 1 of the 4 static blocklist entries the HTTP API enforces.

## Comparison

Continue reading

`kernel/api/file.go` `refuseToAccess()` blocks: 1. `conf/conf.json` (API token, cookie signing key, accessAuthCode) 2. `data/snippets/conf.json` 3. the entire `data/templates` directory 4. `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json` 5. (dynamic, per-request) any path the current publish-mode session isn't authorized for

`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go` `resolvePath()` blocks only: ```go confPath := filepath.Join(util.ConfDir, "conf.json") if abs == confPath { return "", fmt.Errorf("access to conf.json is forbidden") } ``` Items 2, 3, and 4 are absent. The tool's own `list`/`read`/`grep`/`find` actions remain fully functional against them.

## Impact

An MCP client with access to the `file` tool (post-fix for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8, i.e. a properly authenticated Administrator-level caller) can read `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json` directly:

```go type PublishAccessItem struct { ID string `json:"id"` Visible bool `json:"visible"` Password string `json:"password"` // plaintext; empty string = no password Disable bool `json:"disable"` } ```

This exposes the plaintext access password for every publish-mode-shared notebook/document, letting the reader bypass password protection on any publish-mode share. This is a serious sibling issue given the volume of publish-mode access-control bugs already reported against this codebase — the passwords protecting exactly that feature are directly readable through a tool whose own description says "never use for workspace data."

`data/templates` and `data/snippets/conf.json` are lower-severity but still inconsistent with the HTTP API's own precedent for what counts as sensitive.

## Why this is a distinct finding, not a duplicate

GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8 was about *reachability* an unauthenticated Reader-tier JWT being forwarded to admin-scoped paths including `/mcp`. That has been fixed. This report is about the *tool's own scope* once reached by a legitimate, properly-authenticated caller, the remediation notes for that same advisory explicitly called for restricting `resolvePath` to `WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.

log`, which was not implemented; instead the tool retains workspace-wide scope with only a single-file blocklist addition.

## Suggested fix

Either replicate the full `refuseToAccess()` blocklist in `resolvePath()` (minimum fix, keeps parity with the HTTP API going forward by extracting `refuseToAccess`'s path list into a shared helper both call), or implement the originally-recommended allowlist restricting the tool to `WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan/*.log` for read and disabling write/delete/rename/copy entirely unless the caller is Administrator, matching the tool's own advertised "debugging/log reading only" scope.

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: < 0.0.0-20260808051406-3542530c505f

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

4.9

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34 (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 27). SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files (CVE-2026-60083). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-60083

MLA

"SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files (CVE-2026-60083)." KEVWire, 27 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-60083.

Chicago

KEVWire. "SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files (CVE-2026-60083)." Last modified October 27, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-60083.

Evidence summary (plain text)

SiYuan: MCP file tool's blocklist is incomplete relative to the HTTP file API it claims to align with, exposing publish-mode passwords and other sensitive workspace files (Oct 27, 2026).
`kernel/mcp/tools/file.go`'s `resolvePath()` includes an explicit comment stating its
sensitive-path blocklist is meant to align with the HTTP file API's established blacklist
(`refuseToAccess()` in `kernel/api/file.go`), following the remediation for GHSA-cvhv-7xhj-xjp8
("Unauthenticated Administrator takeover exfiltrated via the MCP"), which specifically
recommended restricting this tool's scope. In practice, the MCP tool implements only 1 of the
4 static blocklist entries the HTTP API enforces.

`kernel/api/file.go` `refuseToAccess()` blocks:
1. `conf/conf.json` (API token, cookie signing key, accessAuthCode)
2. `data/snippets/conf.json`
3. the entire `data/templates` directory
4. `data/.siyuan/publishAccess.json`
5. (dynamic, per-request) any path the current publish-mode session isn't authorized for
CVSS 4.9 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 27, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c8r8-95hg-mp34
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-60083.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 27, 2026, 16:00 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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