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Response snapshot Oct 27, 2026, 00:58 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-79982

The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer...

The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint.

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
8.8 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.2% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

Check the vendor advisory for affected versions and fixes.

Read NVD CVE-2026-79982 (opens a new tab)

What happened

The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint.

bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check.

HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.

The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air.

Continue reading

With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE.

In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.

Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution.

Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

8.8

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.2%

Scored Percentile 13.6%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Sources

  1. Primary source

    NVD CVE-2026-79982 (opens a new tab)

    NVD record: description, CVSS (the CNA score is preferred), affected products, and publication date. Not evidence of exploitation.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  4. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  5. Primary source

    NVD CVE API 2.0 (opens a new tab)

    The NVD API page that supplied this CVE record.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  6. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-79982, scored 2026-10-26. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 26). The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer... (CVE-2026-79982). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-79982

MLA

"The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer... (CVE-2026-79982)." KEVWire, 26 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-79982.

Chicago

KEVWire. "The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer... (CVE-2026-79982)." Last modified October 26, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-79982.

Evidence summary (plain text)

The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer... (Oct 23, 2026).
The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.

The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.

Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool
CVSS 8.8 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 26, 2026; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79982).
EPSS 0.2% for the following 30 days, scored Oct 26, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-79982&date=2026-10-26).
Sources:
NVD CVE-2026-79982: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79982
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?lastModStartDate=2026-10-26T13:46:51.330Z&lastModEndDate=2026-10-26T15:20:55.429Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=500
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?lastModStartDate=2026-10-26T13:11:54.490Z&lastModEndDate=2026-10-26T14:45:57.368Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=500
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?lastModStartDate=2026-10-26T12:40:01.998Z&lastModEndDate=2026-10-26T14:10:55.205Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=500
NVD CVE API 2.0: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?pubStartDate=2026-10-12T13:35:55.142Z&pubEndDate=2026-10-26T13:35:55.142Z&resultsPerPage=500&startIndex=9000
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-79982&date=2026-10-26
Record ID: CVE-2026-79982.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 26, 2026, 19:40 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

NVD status: Awaiting Analysis. Publication in the NVD is not evidence of exploitation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

Record JSON

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Record details

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