KEVWire

Security intelligence, with context.

Response snapshot Oct 29, 2026, 01:26 UTC

Back to the wire
Permalink
VulnerabilityCVE-2026-116674

systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name

networkStats() keeps a per interface cache for computing rx_sec / tx_sec between calls. The cache is a plain JavaScript object and is indexed with the interface name the caller supplied. Passing the name proto makes every cache write land on Object.

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
6.5 Medium (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: systeminformation: 5.33.13. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

networkStats() keeps a per interface cache for computing rx_sec / tx_sec between calls. The cache is a plain JavaScript object and is indexed with the interface name the caller supplied. Passing the name proto makes every cache write land on Object.prototype instead of the cache, polluting every object in the Node.js process.

An application is affected if it passes untrusted input as the ifaces argument of si.networkStats() and runs on FreeBSD, OpenBSD or NetBSD.

The vulnerable code

Continue reading

lib/network.js declares the cache as a plain object:

const _network = {};

calcNetworkSpeed() writes into it, keyed by the interface name:

} else {
 if (!_network[iface]) {
 _network[iface] = {};
 }
 _network[iface].rx_bytes = rx_bytes;
 _network[iface].tx_bytes = tx_bytes;
 _network[iface].rx_sec = null;
 _network[iface].tx_sec = null;
 _network[iface].ms = Date.now();
 _network[iface].last_ms = 0;
 _network[iface].operstate = operstate;
}

With iface === 'proto' this misbehaves twice:

1. _network['proto'] does not read a missing own property — it invokes the inherited proto getter and returns Object.prototype, which is truthy. The if (!_network[iface]) guard therefore never creates the {} placeholder. 2. Each following assignment writes onto Object.prototype.

After one call, rx_bytes, tx_bytes, rx_sec, tx_sec, ms, last_ms and operstate are visible on every object in the process. A second call takes the other branch (_network['proto'].ms is now truthy) and keeps them updated.

Why the existing sanitizing does not help

The interface name does pass through util.sanitizeString(iface, true) before it is used as the cache key. That function is a shell metacharacter filter, built to stop command injection in the netstat / ifconfig invocations — a different threat. Property names made of letters and underscores are legitimate interface names and pass through untouched:

"a;id" -> "aid"
"a$(id)" -> "aid"
"a|id" -> "aid"
"a`id`" -> "aid"
"__proto__" -> "__proto__" "constructor" ` prints only its header and exits `0` |

The important part is not that three platforms happen to be safe, but that nothing in the
design prevents the write. Any future platform branch without such a guard reopens the issue,
which is why the fix is applied at the cache rather than at the call sites.

### Age

The pattern predates the v5 line — `git log -S "_network[iface] = {}"` traces it back to a
refactoring before `v3.42.5`. The v3 and v4 lines are end of life; the advisory covers v5.

## Impact

The attacker controls which attributes appear on `Object.prototype` but not their values —
those come from the interface statistics (`rx_bytes`, `ms`, `operstate` …). The attribute
*names* are fixed by the library, so this is not an arbitrary-key pollution primitive.

The consequences are therefore application specific and arise from name collisions:

- Any application code that tests `if (obj.operstate)`, `if (obj.ms)` or similar on an object
 that should not have those properties now takes the wrong branch.
- `for…in` loops over plain objects gain seven extra enumerable keys, which can corrupt
 serialisation, configuration merging or validation logic.
- Libraries that use `{}` as a lookup map and check membership with `in` or truthiness can
 return values for keys that were never inserted.

No path to remote code execution is known, and the values cannot be chosen by the attacker.

## Proof of concept

### The underlying primitive (any platform)

js const { calcNetworkSpeed } = require('systeminformation/lib/network.js'); // internal const cache = {}; // the declaration used by the library calcNetworkSpeed('proto', 1, 2, 'up', 0, 0, 0, 0);

console.log({}.rx_bytes); // 1 console.log({}.operstate); // 'up' console.log(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty('rx_bytes')); // true


### End to end through the public API (FreeBSD / OpenBSD / NetBSD)

js const si = require('systeminformation');

(async () => { console.log('before:', {}.operstate); // undefined await si.networkStats('proto'); // an attacker supplied interface name console.log('after :', {}.operstate); // 'up' -> Object.prototype is polluted })();


On Linux, macOS and Windows the same call returns an empty result set and leaves
`Object.prototype` untouched, for the reasons in the *Reachability* table.

## Patch

`lib/network.js` — give the cache a null prototype, so `__proto__` becomes an ordinary own
property instead of a setter into the prototype chain:

diff -const _network = {}; +const _network = Object.create(null);


This is the smallest change that fixes the class of problem rather than one reachable path:

- It is independent of the platform branches, so no guard has to be added or maintained.
- It keeps behaviour identical for every legitimate interface name — `Object.keys()`,
 member reads and writes all work unchanged on a null prototype object.
- It matches the pattern already used elsewhere in the codebase
 (`lib/filesystem.js:114-115`, `lib/graphics.js:1060`, `lib/graphics.js:1087`).
- `Object.create` is ES5.1, well below the declared `engines.node >= 10.0.0`.

After the patch the hostile name is stored as a normal cache entry:

js const cache = Object.create(null); // ... cache['proto'] holds the stats object, Object.prototype is untouched


## Workarounds

For users who cannot upgrade immediately, either of these is sufficient:

1. **Validate the interface name before calling** — accept only names returned by
 `si.networkInterfaces()`, or reject the names `__proto__`, `constructor` and `prototype`.
2. **Never pass untrusted input** as the `ifaces` argument. Passing `'*'` or omitting the
 argument is unaffected, because those names come from the system rather than the caller.

Freezing `Object.prototype` (`Object.freeze(Object.prototype)`) also prevents the write, but it
has wide-reaching side 

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub:
systeminformation: < 5.33.13

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

6.5

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 28). systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name (CVE-2026-116674). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-116674

MLA

"systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name (CVE-2026-116674)." KEVWire, 28 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-116674.

Chicago

KEVWire. "systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name (CVE-2026-116674)." Last modified October 28, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-116674.

Evidence summary (plain text)

systeminformation has prototype pollution in `networkStats()` via the interface name (Oct 28, 2026).
networkStats() keeps a per interface cache for computing rx_sec / tx_sec between calls.
The cache is a plain JavaScript object and is indexed with the interface name the caller
supplied. Passing the name proto makes every cache write land on Object.prototype
instead of the cache, polluting every object in the Node.js process.

An application is affected if it passes untrusted input as the ifaces argument of
si.networkStats() and runs on FreeBSD, OpenBSD or NetBSD.
CVSS 6.5 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 28, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7648-jmwf-vw7j
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-116674.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 29, 2026, 00:55 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

Record JSON

Your account

Email alerts

Email alerts are coming as part of KEVWire Premium: join the waitlist. To follow your stack today, use its RSS feed, which honors your filters, or connect an AI agent through the API.

Suggest an improvement

Ideas, missing sources, corrections, and bugs are all welcome. No account needed. Suggestions are reviewed by a person before anything changes.

Record details

Record detail