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Response snapshot Nov 5, 2026, 23:11 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-31862

@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Command Injection via Multiple Parameters

Multiple Git-related API endpoints use execAsync() with string interpolation of user-controlled parameters (file, branch, message, commit), allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands. The claudecodeui application provides Git integration through various API endpoints.

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
9.1 Critical (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.5% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: @siteboon/claude-code-ui: 1.24.0. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

Multiple Git-related API endpoints use execAsync() with string interpolation of user-controlled parameters (file, branch, message, commit), allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands.

Details

The claudecodeui application provides Git integration through various API endpoints. These endpoints accept user-controlled parameters such as file paths, branch names, commit messages, and commit hashes, which are directly interpolated into shell command strings passed to execAsync().

Continue reading

The application attempts to escape double quotes in some parameters, but this protection is trivially bypassable using other shell metacharacters such as:

Command substitution: $(command) or \command\ Command chaining: ;, &&, || Newlines and other control characters

Affected Endpoints

GET /api/git/diff - file parameter GET /api/git/status - file parameter POST /api/git/commit - files array and message parameter POST /api/git/checkout - branch parameter POST /api/git/create-branch - branch parameter GET /api/git/commits - commit hash parameter GET /api/git/commit-diff - commit parameter

Vulnerable Code

File: server/routes/git.js

// Line 205 - git status with file parameter
const { stdout: statusOutput } = await execAsync(
 `git status --porcelain "${file}"`, // INJECTION via file
 { cwd: projectPath }
);
// Lines 375-379 - git commit with files array and message
for (const file of files) {
 await execAsync(`git add "${file}"`, { cwd: projectPath }); // INJECTION via files[]
}
const { stdout } = await execAsync(
 `git commit -m "${message.replace(/"/g, '\\"')}"`, // INJECTION via message (bypass with $())
 { cwd: projectPath }
);
// Lines 541-543 - git show with commit parameter (no quotes!)
const { stdout } = await execAsync(
 `git show ${commit}`, // INJECTION via commit
 { cwd: projectPath }
);

Impact

- Remote Code Execution as the Node.js process user - Full server compromise - Data exfiltration - Supply chain attacks - modify committed code to inject malware

---

Fix

Commit: siteboon/claudecodeui@55567f4

Root cause remediation

All vulnerable execAsync() calls have been replaced with the existing spawnAsync() helper (which uses child_process.spawn with shell: false). Arguments are passed as an array directly to the OS — shell metacharacters in user input are inert.

Endpoints patched in server/routes/git.js:

- GET /api/git/diff — file (4 calls) - GET /api/git/file-with-diff — file (3 calls) - POST /api/git/commit — files[], message - POST /api/git/checkout — branch - POST /api/git/create-branch — branch - GET /api/git/commits — commit.hash - GET /api/git/commit-diff — commit - POST /api/git/generate-commit-message — file - POST /api/git/discard — file (3 calls) - POST /api/git/delete-untracked — file - POST /api/git/publish — branch

A strict allowlist regex (/^[0-9a-f]{4,64}$/i) was also added to validate the commit parameter in /api/git/commit-diff before it reaches the git process.

Before / After

// BEFORE — shell interprets the string, injection possible
const { stdout } = await execAsync(`git show ${commit}`, { cwd: projectPath });

// AFTER — no shell, args passed directly to the process
const { stdout } = await spawnAsync('git', ['show', commit], { cwd: projectPath });

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: @siteboon/claude-code-ui: <= 1.23.0

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

9.1

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.5%

Scored Percentile 39.6%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-31862, scored 2026-11-05. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, November 5). @siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Command Injection via Multiple Parameters (CVE-2026-31862). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-31862

MLA

"@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Command Injection via Multiple Parameters (CVE-2026-31862)." KEVWire, 5 Nov. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-31862.

Chicago

KEVWire. "@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Command Injection via Multiple Parameters (CVE-2026-31862)." Last modified November 5, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-31862.

Evidence summary (plain text)

@siteboon/claude-code-ui is Vulnerable to Command Injection via Multiple Parameters (Mar 11, 2026).
Multiple Git-related API endpoints use execAsync() with string interpolation of user-controlled parameters (file, branch, message, commit), allowing authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands.

The claudecodeui application provides Git integration through various API endpoints. These endpoints accept user-controlled parameters such as file paths, branch names, commit messages, and commit hashes, which are directly interpolated into shell command strings passed to execAsync().
CVSS 9.1 (version 3.1; evidence as of Nov 5, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q).
EPSS 0.5% for the following 30 days, scored Nov 5, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-31862&date=2026-11-05).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f2fc-vc88-6w7q
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-31862&date=2026-11-05
Record ID: CVE-2026-31862.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Nov 5, 2026, 19:11 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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