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Response snapshot Nov 5, 2026, 22:51 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-62300

filecoin-pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust server resources

The IPFS Pinning Service API implementation accepts a caller-controlled CID through POST /pins, queues background processing, and then recursively fetches the full DAG with helia.pins.add(cid).

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
6.5 Medium (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.2% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: filecoin-pin: 1.1.1. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

The IPFS Pinning Service API implementation accepts a caller-controlled CID through POST /pins, queues background processing, and then recursively fetches the full DAG with helia.pins.add(cid). The route and background pinning path do not enforce a request rate limit, per-user quota, maximum DAG byte count, maximum block count, traversal timeout, or concurrent pinning limit.

An authenticated caller, or an unauthenticated caller when the server is started with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, can submit one or more pins whose CIDs resolve to very large DAGs. The server writes fetched blocks to CAR files under carStoragePath and can consume disk, network, CPU, and libp2p resources until the process or host becomes unavailable.

Details

Continue reading

POST /pins validates only that the request body contains a syntactically valid CID string, then forwards it to the pin store:

- src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts:304-342 accepts the request, parses cid with CID.parse, and calls pinStore.pin(request.user, cidObject, parsed.options). - src/filecoin-pin-store.ts:153-188 stores the pin as queued and schedules _processPinInBackground with setTimeout. There is no queue, semaphore, or global cap around this scheduling. - src/filecoin-pin-store.

ts:211-217 creates a per-pin Helia node and forwards caller-supplied origins. - src/filecoin-pin-store.ts:260-274 walks the full DAG with for await (const pinnedCid of helia.pins.add(cid)). - src/create-pinning-helia.ts:47-80 creates a libp2p/Helia node with the Bitswap block broker and no application-level resource limits. - src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts:65-107 writes every fetched block and updates stats.

totalSize only after writing. - src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts:84-93 streams blocks to the CAR writer on disk.

The Helia node created for each pin has no bootstrap or mDNS configuration (src/create-pinning-helia.ts:57). A public CID alone may therefore not be fetchable unless the node can reach a content source. In practice, the API also accepts origins, so an attacker can supply a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p origin that serves a large DAG and cause the server to retrieve it.

Impact

Successful exploitation affects availability:

- Disk exhaustion from unbounded CAR files in carStoragePath. - Network exhaustion from recursive Bitswap retrieval. - CPU and memory pressure from concurrent libp2p/Helia pin operations. - Service degradation or process failure for other users of the daemon. - Operational cost and manual recovery burden from large partial CAR files.

The default daemon configuration reduces exposure because the server binds to localhost and refuses to start without an access token unless ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true. The finding is most significant when the daemon is exposed beyond localhost, when the token is shared across untrusted users, or when the no-auth mode is enabled.

PoC

curl -X POST "https://target.example/pins" \
 -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \
 -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
 -d '{
 "cid": "CID_OF_LARGE_DAG",
 "origins": ["/ip4/203.0.113.10/tcp/4001/p2p/ATTACKER_PEER_ID"],
 "meta": { "purpose": "resource-exhaustion-validation" }
 }'

Submitting many such requests concurrently accelerates resource pressure because each request schedules independent background processing.

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: filecoin-pin: <= 1.1.0

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

6.5

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.2%

Scored Percentile 16.3%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-62300, scored 2026-11-05. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, November 5). filecoin-pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust server resources (CVE-2026-62300). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62300

MLA

"filecoin-pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust server resources (CVE-2026-62300)." KEVWire, 5 Nov. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62300.

Chicago

KEVWire. "filecoin-pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust server resources (CVE-2026-62300)." Last modified November 5, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62300.

Evidence summary (plain text)

filecoin-pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust server resources (Nov 5, 2026).
The IPFS Pinning Service API implementation accepts a caller-controlled CID through POST /pins, queues background processing, and then recursively fetches the full DAG with helia.pins.add(cid). The route and background pinning path do not enforce a request rate limit, per-user quota, maximum DAG byte count, maximum block count, traversal timeout, or concurrent pinning limit.

An authenticated caller, or an unauthenticated caller when the server is started with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, can submit one or more pins whose CIDs resolve to very large DAGs.
CVSS 6.5 (version 3.1; evidence as of Nov 5, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h).
EPSS 0.2% for the following 30 days, scored Nov 5, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-62300&date=2026-11-05).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m5ph-mmg5-6w5h
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-62300&date=2026-11-05
Record ID: CVE-2026-62300.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Nov 5, 2026, 19:11 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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