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Response snapshot Nov 3, 2026, 01:01 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-77526

FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE

FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName) concatenates $destiny and $destinyName without normalizing the resulting path.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
9.9 Critical (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: facturascripts/facturascripts: 2026.3. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName) concatenates $destiny and $destinyName without normalizing the resulting path. Every caller in the codebase passes UploadedFile::getClientOriginalName() — the unsanitized client-supplied filename — as $destinyName, so an authenticated user submitting a filename containing ../ segments can write the uploaded content to any directory writable by the web-server user, escaping the intended MyFiles/ location.

Because the shipped htaccess-sample (the documented production Apache configuration) excludes Dinamic/Assets/ and node_modules/ from the index.php rewrite, files written into those directories are served directly by Apache. Combined with .htaccess not being in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the primitive escalates from arbitrary file write to remote code execution.

Vulnerable Code

Continue reading

Core/UploadedFile.php:

private const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = ['phar', 'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'php7', 'php8', 'pht', 'phtml', 'phps'];

public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
 if (!$this->isValid()) {
 return false;
 }
 if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
 $destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
 }
 return $this->test ?
 rename($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName) :
 move_uploaded_file($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}

public function getClientOriginalName(): string
{
 return $this->name ?? '';
}

isValid() only checks the extension blocklist, the upload error code, and is_uploaded_file() — it never inspects the filename for directory separators or .. segments.

Six call sites pass the raw client filename straight into move():

- Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:58 — POST /api/3/uploadfiles - Core/Controller/ApiAttachedFiles.php:136 — POST /api/3/attachedfiles - Core/Lib/Widget/WidgetFile.php:84 — every form using a file widget - Core/Lib/Widget/WidgetLibrary.php:215 — library widget upload - Core/Lib/ExtendedController/DocFilesTrait.php:51 — document files trait - Core/Controller/AdminPlugins.php:260 — plugin (zip) upload

Representative sink — Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:56-79:

private function uploadFile(UploadedFile $uploadFile): ?AttachedFile
{
 if (false === $uploadFile->isValid()) {
 return null;
 }
 $destiny = FS_FOLDER . '/MyFiles/';
 $destinyName = $uploadFile->getClientOriginalName();
 if (file_exists($destiny . $destinyName)) {
 $destinyName = mt_rand(1, 999999) . '_' . $destinyName;
 }
 if ($uploadFile->move($destiny, $destinyName)) {
 ...
 }
}

Shipped htaccess-sample (production Apache rules):

 
 RewriteEngine On
 RewriteBase /
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !Dinamic/Assets/ [NC]
 RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !node_modules/ [NC]
 RewriteRule . index.php [L]

Apache therefore serves any file under Dinamic/Assets/ directly, bypassing index.php entirely.

Step 1 — Static reproduction of the file-write primitive

The following script replicates UploadedFile::move()'s rename() path verbatim inside a sandboxed temp directory. It does not run any payload — it only demonstrates that the destination escapes MyFiles/ when the filename contains ../.

 
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---X

-----X
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="files[]"; filename="../Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain

static-verification-marker
-----X--

After the request, Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt exists on disk and is reachable at https://target/Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt — Apache serves it directly because the path is excluded from the index.php rewrite.

Step 3 — Chain to code execution

Because .htaccess is not in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the same primitive can write an Apache override into Dinamic/Assets/:

1. Upload with filename ../Dinamic/Assets/.htaccess and body AddType application/x-httpd-php .png 2. Upload with filename ../Dinamic/Assets/x.png containing a PHP payload (extension png is not blocked, content is not validated by isValid()) 3. Request https://target/Dinamic/Assets/x.png — Apache hands it to the PHP handler per the uploaded .htaccess

Root Cause

UploadedFile::move() performs raw $destiny . $destinyName concatenation and trusts getClientOriginalName(), which returns $this->name ?? '' with no normalization. No call site applies basename() or any equivalent before passing the client filename to move(). The blocklist in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS covers only PHP-family extensions and does not cover htaccess, which is required for the rewrite-excluded directory to be useful for code execution.

Impact

Authenticated attacker (any role with permission to call one of the six upload entry points — including any user allowed to attach a file to a record, or any API token with uploadfiles/attachedfiles access) can:

- Write arbitrary content to any path under the application root that is writable by the web-server user, including Dinamic/Assets/ (Apache-direct-served) and node_modules/. - Overwrite shipped JS/CSS inside Dinamic/Assets/, injecting client-side script that executes in every administrator's browser → session takeover on next admin page load. - Drop a .

htaccess into Dinamic/Assets/ remapping a benign extension to the PHP handler, followed by a second upload that lands an executable payload — full remote code execution as the web-server user.

The required precondition is only an authenticated session or API token with upload privileges, which is granted to a wide range of non-administrative roles in standard installations.

Fix

Minimal fix — sanitize inside UploadedFile::move() so every call site is covered automatically:

public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
 if (!$this->isValid()) {
 return false;
 }
 // strip any directory component from the client-supplied filename
 $destinyName = basename($destinyName);
 if (sub

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub:
facturascripts/facturascripts: >= 2025, <= 2026.2

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

9.9

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

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Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4 (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, November 2). FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE (CVE-2026-77526). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-77526

MLA

"FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE (CVE-2026-77526)." KEVWire, 2 Nov. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-77526.

Chicago

KEVWire. "FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE (CVE-2026-77526)." Last modified November 2, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-77526.

Evidence summary (plain text)

FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to   RCE (Jul 14, 2026).
FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName) concatenates $destiny and $destinyName without normalizing the resulting path. Every caller in the codebase passes UploadedFile::getClientOriginalName() — the unsanitized client-supplied filename — as $destinyName, so an authenticated user submitting a filename containing ../ segments can write the uploaded content to any directory writable by the web-server user, escaping the intended MyFiles/ location.
CVSS 9.9 (version 3.1; evidence as of Nov 2, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgjx-r89m-m7v4
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-77526.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Nov 3, 2026, 01:00 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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