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Response snapshot Oct 31, 2026, 01:26 UTC

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VulnerabilityCVE-2026-96633

AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion

AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action.

Published Updated

At a glance

Exploited
Not known
Severity
8.1 High (CVSS 3.1)
Chance of exploitation
Not estimated
Sources
1 source

What to do

GitHub lists first patched versions: adminneo-org/adminneo: 5.5.1. Confirm the affected range and upgrade guidance in the exact advisory.

Read GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq (opens a new tab)

What happened

Summary

AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted db[] values directly to unlink().

Originally reported by @slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqc

Impact

Continue reading

An authenticated AdminNeo SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list db[] field. If the PHP process can delete that path, AdminNeo unlinks it even when the file is not a SQLite database.

Root Cause

The database-list page accepts selected database names from the POST body and calls drop_databases():

if ($_POST["db"]) {
 queries_redirect(substr(ME, 0, -1), lang('Databases have been dropped.'), drop_databases($_POST["db"]));
}

In SQLite mode, drop_databases() attaches an in-memory database and unlinks each submitted path directly:

function drop_databases($databases): bool
{
 Connection::get()->close(); // to unlock file, doesn't work in PDO on Windows
 foreach ($databases as $db) {
 if (!@unlink($db)) {
 Connection::get()->setError(lang('File exists.'));
 return false;
 }
 }
 return true;
}

The same SQLite driver protects create and rename operations with check_sqlite_name(), which requires a .db, .sdb, or .sqlite extension:

function check_sqlite_name($name) {
 // avoid creating PHP files on unsecured servers
 $extensions = "db|sdb|sqlite";
 if (!preg_match("~^[^\\0]*\\.($extensions)\$~", $name)) {
 Connection::get()->setError(lang('Please use one of the extensions %s.', str_replace("|", ", ", $extensions)));
 return false;
 }
 return true;
}

The drop path does not apply an equivalent extension check or bind the submitted path to a known listed SQLite database.

1. Start a complete AdminNeo application

Build and start AdminNeo from the audited source using the official standalone Docker image shape. The validation image copies the audited source tree into /var/www/html and starts Nginx HTTP server.

Log in through the SQLite entry point using a SQLite database path poc.sqlite.

2. Prepare a writable target file

Place a non-database file under a location writable by the AdminNeo PHP process. The validation used:

/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt

The same directory also contained a SQLite database:

/var/www/html/poc.sqlite

3. Submit the database-list drop request

Use the authenticated session and live CSRF token, but submit the non-database path as the selected database:

POST /?sqlite=&username= HTTP/1.1
Host: 
Cookie: 
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

db[]=/var/www/html/poc-delete-target.txt&all=&drop=Drop&token=

The request reaches drop_databases($_POST["db"]), and SQLite drop_databases() calls unlink() on the submitted non-database path.

After the request, the poc-delete-target.txt was deleted.

Suggested Fix

Apply the same target validation used by SQLite create/rename before deleting database files. At minimum: - Reject paths whose basename does not end in .db, .sdb, or .sqlite. - Bind db[] values to databases returned by AdminNeo's database listing instead of trusting submitted paths. - Resolve paths before deletion and reject traversal outside the expected SQLite database directory.

- Consider requiring the current selected database path for delete operations instead of accepting arbitrary submitted file paths.

Affected package ranges reported by GitHub: adminneo-org/adminneo: < 5.5.1

Scores and how they were measured

CVSS base severity

8.1

Version 3.1As of

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Measurement source (opens a new tab)

How bad it is if exploited. Not a prediction of exploitation or proof you are exposed.

EPSS probability

Not available

A model's estimate of exploitation in the next 30 days, not certainty or your own risk.

Related technology

Follow PHP packages (Composer): RSS feedAll its recordsAsk your AI assistant

Sources

  1. Primary source

    GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq (opens a new tab)

    The public advisory supplies the description, affected package/version ranges, and any listed CVSS metric. GitHub review is not local review.

    Published Checked

  2. Primary source

    GitHub public advisory API page (opens a new tab)

    The API page supplied GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq, its actual identifiers, source dates, and structured metrics.

    Published Date not suppliedChecked

Cite this record

For factual claims, cite the primary sources above; cite KEVWire for its compilation, dates, and classifications.

APA

KEVWire. (2026, October 30). AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2026-96633). https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-96633

MLA

"AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2026-96633)." KEVWire, 30 Oct. 2026, kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-96633.

Chicago

KEVWire. "AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2026-96633)." Last modified October 30, 2026. https://kevwire.com/record/CVE-2026-96633.

Evidence summary (plain text)

AdminNeo SQLite Database-List Drop Arbitrary File Deletion (Oct 30, 2026).
AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted db[] values directly to unlink().

Originally reported by @slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqc

An authenticated AdminNeo SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list db[] field.
CVSS 8.1 (version 3.1; evidence as of Oct 30, 2026; https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq).
Sources:
GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vfx-w7q3-42gq
GitHub public advisory API page: https://api.github.com/advisories?type=reviewed&per_page=100&sort=updated&direction=desc
Record ID: CVE-2026-96633.
Record origin: Ingested record.
AI evidence: Not assessed.
Known exploitation: Not assessed.
Zero-day status: Not assessed. KEV membership alone does not establish zero-day status.
About this data

This record was ingested from a data source. Retrieved: Oct 31, 2026, 00:50 UTC. Ingestion is not an independent editorial investigation.

A CISA KEV listing documents known exploitation, not necessarily a zero-day; absence from the catalog does not prove a vulnerability has never been exploited.

Technology tags indicate possible relevance, not verified exposure. Confirm the affected product, version, and configuration against your own inventory; KEVWire does not scan your systems.

A personal reading checklist on this device, not verified remediation.

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